Bad Youth: The Effects of Family Dynamics and Political Patronage on Juvenile Gang Crime in Dhaka, Bangladesh

Abstract

This study investigates the role of familial dynamics and political influences in shaping the emergence of adolescent gangs in Bangladesh, with particular attention to Dhaka. While earlier research has explored various dimensions of juvenile delinquency, limited attention has been given to how family conditions intersect with political patronage in fostering gang involvement. Drawing on qualitative case study research, the paper analyzes in-depth interviews with juvenile gang members, their parents, and police officials. The findings indicate that inadequate parental involvement, conflict-ridden family environments, and permissive parenting practices foster neglect and emotional vulnerability, driving adolescents to seek identity, belonging, and recognition within gangs. These risks are compounded by poverty and precarious living conditions. Simultaneously, political patronage and entrenched clientelist practices offer protection and incentives for young people to engage in gang-related violence, extortion, and local disputes. By drawing on rational choice theory, differential association theory, and the dynamics of patron–client politics, the study situates juvenile gang crime in Bangladesh within both familial and political structures. It argues that effective responses require comprehensive strategies that reinforce family support, limit political exploitation of youth, and address the commercialization of gang networks.